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RML

Ridgecrest Management, LLC

1 fund◔ Unclaimed
💬 Discuss
Avg Composite
11.7
Mid pack
Active funds
1
of 1 vintage
Total raised
not disclosed
Followers
0
not followed yet
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Composite score · by vintage

1 scored fund · avg 11.7
2550752026SIG26, LLC · vintage 2026 · 11.7
Top quartile Middle Lower Sponsor avg

Disclosures & prior history10 disclosures · worst high

Material items extracted from the risk-factor, conflicts, and prior-performance sections of Ridgecrest Management, LLC's PPMs. Each is quoted verbatim with its source page — surfaced, not editorialized.

Related-party conflict disclosed — Future funds and Target Company dilution

High

The Manager intends to form new funds that will also contribute to the Target Company, diluting the Fund's interest and potentially conflicting with the Fund's interests.

The Manager intends to form new funds in future private offerings, which funds are expected to contribute capital to the Target Company in exchange for membership interests in the Target Company... These funds may have interests which conflict with the Fund's interests and their admission as members to the Target Company will dilute the Fund's interest in the Target Company.
PPM p.9295% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Manager removal difficulty

High

The Manager cannot practically be removed from Project Companies without its consent, and removal from the Target Company requires 50% Target Company Member consent which Sponsor-affiliated holders would likely vote against.

it will not be feasible to remove the Manager as manager of a Project Company without the Manager's consent. Further, the Manager may be removed as manager of the Target Company only with the consent of Target Company Members holding at least a 50% interest... The Sponsors and/or their affiliates are expected to hold ownership interests in the Target Company and would likely vote against the removal of the Manager for cause.
PPM p.9395% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — The Manager (Ridgecrest Management, LLC)

High

The Manager of the Fund also serves as manager of the Target Company and Project Companies, receiving fees and profit distributions (Class I Member) before the Fund receives distributions, creating conflicts in decision-making.

The Manager of the Fund is also the manager of the Target Company and the Project Companies. As such, the Manager will receive fees (including the Due Diligence Fees and the Asset Management Fees) from the Target Company and Project Companies and distributions from the Project Companies from its Class I Membership Interest before distributions are made to the Target Company, and in turn to the Fund and its Members.
PPM p.9295% confidence

Key-person history disclosed — Ross Hubbard, Ryan Sudeck, Emily Hubbard

Medium

The Fund is substantially dependent on the Manager's principals; no key-person life insurance is maintained.

The Fund is substantially dependent on the services of the Manager, and in particular Ross Hubbard and Ryan Sudeck as the managers of the Manager, and Emily Hubbard... Further, the Fund does not maintain key person life insurance for the principals as of the date of this Memorandum.
PPM p.10195% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Competing projects owned by Sponsor/Manager

Medium

The Manager, Sponsor and affiliates own and operate other commercial real estate projects that may compete directly with the Fund's Projects, and Members have no interest in those ventures.

The Manager, the Sponsor and/or their Affiliates currently own, operate and manage (directly or indirectly) multiple commercial real estate projects in Washington and other states. These projects may compete directly or indirectly with the Target Company, the Project Companies and the business of the Company.
PPM p.4290% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Manager fee assignment to certain Members

Medium

The Manager intends to assign a portion of its fee income and profit interest to third parties, expected to include certain Fund Members, creating misalignment among Members.

the Manager intends to assign a portion of the fee income it receives to third parties, which is expected to include certain Members of the Fund. This creates a conflict of interest because those certain Members that receive a portion of the Manager's fees may not be aligned with the other Members of the Fund
PPM p.9295% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Manager valuation discretion

Medium

The Manager has broad discretion in determining Fund asset valuations, which may affect fees, capital accounts, dilution, and subscription/redemption pricing, and may differ materially from independent third-party valuations.

The Manager has broad discretion in determining the valuation of the Fund's assets, including with respect to the selection of valuation or appraisal methodologies, assumptions, and the timing of such valuations... may materially differ from valuations that would be determined by independent third parties.
PPM p.9390% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — No independent investment or advisory committee

Medium

The Fund has no independent investment committee, advisory committee, or other fiduciary acting for Members; all decisions rest with the Manager and Sponsors.

The Fund does not maintain an independent investment committee, advisory committee, or other fiduciary acting on behalf of the Members. All investment, operational, and governance decisions are made by the Manager and the Sponsors, which may give rise to actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest.
PPM p.9395% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Ross Hubbard broker fees

Medium

Principal Ross Hubbard receives broker fees upon acquisition or sale of Projects by Project Companies, which may conflict with optimal timing/pricing of transactions.

Ross Hubbard normally receives a broker fee upon a Project Company's acquisition or sale of a Project in consideration for his broker services. The Sponsor's interest in consummating transactions in order to receive broker fees could be in conflict with waiting to purchase and sell Projects at optimal times and for optimal prices.
PPM p.9395% confidence

Related-party conflict disclosed — Sponsor guaranties on Project loans

Medium

Sponsors and affiliates guarantee completion of improvements and may guarantee Bridge/Permanent Loan repayment, creating an incentive to prioritize limiting personal liability over Fund interests.

The Sponsors and/or their affiliates have guaranteed, and expect to guarantee in the future, the completion of the improvements to the Projects and may guarantee the repayment of the Bridge Loans and/or Permanent Loans... actions the Manager and/or Principals may take on behalf of the Fund, the Target Company or Project Company may not be in the best interest of the Fund or the Members
PPM p.9290% confidence

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